Chapter 43: Medical Negligence
1. O. William Ferguson, Sr. v. J. Clifford Brown, D.C., No. M2007-02590-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2008).
The Court's Summary:
"The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion by applying an incorrect legal standard in denying Plaintiff’s motion to set aside an order summarily dismissing his Complaint. Plaintiff filed this action against his chiropractor alleging injures due to a violation of the appropriate standard of care. Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment based upon Plaintiff’s failure to support the allegations with expert medical testimony. Plaintiff failed to file a written response to the motion or appear at the hearing on the motion and, as a consequence, the trial court summarily dismissed the Complaint. Twenty-nine days after the order was entered, Plaintiff filed a motion pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(1) to set aside the order due to his attorney’s excusable neglect. An affidavit of the attorney filed in support of the motion stated that the attorney’s failure to file a response and attend the hearing were due to his failure to calender the pertinent dates when the motion was received, which omission was due to the fact he was attending to significant personal and legal needs of his brother who was suffering from a life threatening condition. The trial court denied the motion to set aside on the ground of prejudice to Defendant. We have determined the trial court’s decision to deny the motion to set aside was based on its application of an incorrect legal standard. Applying the legal standard set forth in State ex rel. Sizemore v. United Physicians Ins. Risk Retention Group, 56 S.W.3d 557, 567 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001), we have determined the omissions of Plaintiff’s attorney constitute excusable neglect and, therefore, the motion to set aside the order of summary judgment should have been granted."
The Court's Summary:
"The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion by applying an incorrect legal standard in denying Plaintiff’s motion to set aside an order summarily dismissing his Complaint. Plaintiff filed this action against his chiropractor alleging injures due to a violation of the appropriate standard of care. Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment based upon Plaintiff’s failure to support the allegations with expert medical testimony. Plaintiff failed to file a written response to the motion or appear at the hearing on the motion and, as a consequence, the trial court summarily dismissed the Complaint. Twenty-nine days after the order was entered, Plaintiff filed a motion pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(1) to set aside the order due to his attorney’s excusable neglect. An affidavit of the attorney filed in support of the motion stated that the attorney’s failure to file a response and attend the hearing were due to his failure to calender the pertinent dates when the motion was received, which omission was due to the fact he was attending to significant personal and legal needs of his brother who was suffering from a life threatening condition. The trial court denied the motion to set aside on the ground of prejudice to Defendant. We have determined the trial court’s decision to deny the motion to set aside was based on its application of an incorrect legal standard. Applying the legal standard set forth in State ex rel. Sizemore v. United Physicians Ins. Risk Retention Group, 56 S.W.3d 557, 567 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001), we have determined the omissions of Plaintiff’s attorney constitute excusable neglect and, therefore, the motion to set aside the order of summary judgment should have been granted."
2. Debra J. Eaton v. Stephen G. Portera, M.D., No. W2007-02720-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2008).
The Court's Summary:
"This is a medical malpractice case. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee doctor on grounds of insufficient service of process, and failure of Appellant patient to come forward with the required expert proof to refute the motion for summary judgment. Finding no error, we affirm."
The Court's Summary:
"This is a medical malpractice case. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee doctor on grounds of insufficient service of process, and failure of Appellant patient to come forward with the required expert proof to refute the motion for summary judgment. Finding no error, we affirm."
3. Earnest Edwin Gilchrist v. Juan T. Aristorenas, M.D., No. W2007-01919-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2008).
The Court's Summary:
"This appeal arises from a medical malpractice claim. The defendant physician performed an operation on the plaintiff patient. Complications occurred during the surgery; as a result, the patient required several more procedures and spent approximately three weeks in the hospital. The patient hired an attorney, who obtained an opinion letter from a physician expert, in which the expert opined that the defendant physician breached the standard of care during the patient’s initial operation. After securing the expert opinion, the patient filed this lawsuit against the defendant physician for medical malpractice. After the case had been pending for several years, the attorney for the defendant physician took the deposition of the patient’s expert. At the deposition, the patient’s expert changed his opinion, and testified that he believed that the defendant physician’s care of the patient was not below the standard of care. The next day, the defendant physician filed a motion for summary judgment. Several months later, the patient filed a motion under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.07 requesting a continuance of the summary judgment motion because he had been unable to engage another expert. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a continuance and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant physician. The patient appeals. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in denying his request to continue the motion for summary judgment. We affirm, finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the request for a continuance, and thus in the grant of summary judgment in the defendant’s favor."
4. Beverly Lockard v. Christopher H. Bratton, M.D., et al., No. W2007-02820-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2009).
The Court's Summary:
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court erred in excluding Appellant’s expert’s standard of care and causation opinions and in granting summary judgment to the Appellees as to Appellant’s medical malpractice and lack of informed consent claims. We affirm.
NEW SECTION - STANDARD OF CARE:
1. Thomas Geesling, Individually and as the Administrator of the Estate of Sharon Geesling v. Livingston Regional Hospital, LLC, No. 2007-02726-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2008).
The Court's Summary:
The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant in this medical malpractice case after finding that the affidavit of plaintiff’s nursing expert failed to meet the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115. Based upon our conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the affidavit of plaintiff’s expert witness did not satisfy Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
2. Beverly Lockard v. Christopher H. Bratton, M.D., et al., No. W2007-02820-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2009).
The Court's Summary:
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court erred in excluding Appellant’s expert’s standard of care and causation opinions and in granting summary judgment to the Appellees as to Appellant’s medical malpractice and lack of informed consent claims. We affirm.
3. Melissa Michelle Cox v. M. A. Primary and Urgent Care Clinic and Austin Adams, No. M2007-01840-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2009).
The Court's Summary:
Plaintiff in medical malpractice action appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant doctor and clinic. The trial court found that the deposition testimony of Plaintiff’s expert witness failed to establish genuine issues of material fact with respect to the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115(a). Finding error, we reverse and remand the case for further proceedings.
NEW SECTION - CORPORATE LIABILITY DOCTRINE:
1. Debra M. Barkes, Individually and as Surviving Spouse of Jewell Wayne Barkes, Deceased v. River Park Hospital, Inc. and River Park Hospital (TN), No. M2006-01214-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2008).
The Court's Summary:
Wife of patient brought medical malpractice action for the wrongful death of her husband who died at home later in the same day that he was examined in the emergency room. The patient had been examined, diagnosed and discharged by a nurse practitioner without being seen by a physician. The only direct claim against the hospital was whether the hospital was liable because a written policy, which required that every patient presented to the emergency room be seen by a physician, was not followed by the health care providers in the Emergency Department. The jury returned a verdict exonerating all of the individual health care providers directly or indirectly involved with the care of the plaintiff’s husband; however, the jury found that the hospital was 100% at fault for his death. The hospital appealed contending the jury’s verdict must be set aside because it was inconsistent and irreconcilable. Because the jury found that none of the health care providers were at fault, the only basis for upholding the jury’s verdict against the Hospital is upon the doctrine of corporate liability. Tennessee has not adopted the doctrine of corporate liability; therefore, the verdict, exonerating all individual health care providers of fault and finding the hospital 100% at fault, constitutes an inconsistent and irreconcilable verdict. We, therefore, reverse and remand the case for a new trial.
NEW SECTION - PEER REVIEW ACT:
1. Kimberly Powell vs. Community Health Systems, Inc., National Health Care of Cleveland, Inc., d/b/a Cleveland Community Hospital, No. E2008-00535-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2009) (Susano, Charles D. dissenting).
The Court's Summary:
We granted an appeal pursuant to Rule 9, Tenn. R. App. P., to determine the extent of discovery that would be allowed of an infection control nurse who had investigated the infectious rates at the hospital, because the investigation was prompted by the hospital’s Quality Control Committee. Defendants argued that the investigation was confidential and privileged, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 63-6-219. The Trial Court allowed discovery and we affirm, setting forth parameters of the discovery.
The Court's Summary:
"This appeal arises from a medical malpractice claim. The defendant physician performed an operation on the plaintiff patient. Complications occurred during the surgery; as a result, the patient required several more procedures and spent approximately three weeks in the hospital. The patient hired an attorney, who obtained an opinion letter from a physician expert, in which the expert opined that the defendant physician breached the standard of care during the patient’s initial operation. After securing the expert opinion, the patient filed this lawsuit against the defendant physician for medical malpractice. After the case had been pending for several years, the attorney for the defendant physician took the deposition of the patient’s expert. At the deposition, the patient’s expert changed his opinion, and testified that he believed that the defendant physician’s care of the patient was not below the standard of care. The next day, the defendant physician filed a motion for summary judgment. Several months later, the patient filed a motion under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.07 requesting a continuance of the summary judgment motion because he had been unable to engage another expert. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a continuance and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant physician. The patient appeals. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in denying his request to continue the motion for summary judgment. We affirm, finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the request for a continuance, and thus in the grant of summary judgment in the defendant’s favor."
4. Beverly Lockard v. Christopher H. Bratton, M.D., et al., No. W2007-02820-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2009).
The Court's Summary:
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court erred in excluding Appellant’s expert’s standard of care and causation opinions and in granting summary judgment to the Appellees as to Appellant’s medical malpractice and lack of informed consent claims. We affirm.
5. Robin Farley, et al vs. Oak Ridge Medical Imaging, P.C., et al, No. E2008-01731-COA-R3-CV (Aug. 13, 2009).
The Court's Summary:
This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict in the amount of $2,780,000 in a medical malpractice action based upon a failure to detect and report an abnormality on a mammogram. Robin Farley (“the Patient”) and her husband, Dennis Farley (“the Husband”), are the plaintiffs in this action; they are referred to collectively in this opinion as “the Plaintiffs.” Dr. James Rouse and his employer, Oak Ridge Medical Imaging, P.C., dba Oak Ridge Breast Center, P.C. (“the Breast Center”), are the defendants, referenced collectively as “the Defendants.” The Patient reported to the Breast Center on November 15, 2001, for a mammogram. Dr. Rouse read the mammogram and reported his findings as normal. In 2004, the Patient noticed an indentation in her right breast. Follow-up care revealed stage IV incurable breast cancer. According to the Plaintiffs, the cancer was present in 2001, and was treatable and curable had it been properly detected and reported. The Defendants conceded very little and alleged, as an affirmative defense, that the Patient knew that repeat mammograms were needed but failed to come back until it was too late. The case was tried to a jury over four consecutive days. The jury began deliberations on a Friday and resumed and announced its verdict on the following Monday. It found the Defendants negligent, but apportioned 20% of the fault to the Plaintiffs, apparently based upon the Patient’s failure to have a timely follow-up mammogram. The Defendants appeal, raising a host of issues. We affirm.
The Court's Summary:
This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict in the amount of $2,780,000 in a medical malpractice action based upon a failure to detect and report an abnormality on a mammogram. Robin Farley (“the Patient”) and her husband, Dennis Farley (“the Husband”), are the plaintiffs in this action; they are referred to collectively in this opinion as “the Plaintiffs.” Dr. James Rouse and his employer, Oak Ridge Medical Imaging, P.C., dba Oak Ridge Breast Center, P.C. (“the Breast Center”), are the defendants, referenced collectively as “the Defendants.” The Patient reported to the Breast Center on November 15, 2001, for a mammogram. Dr. Rouse read the mammogram and reported his findings as normal. In 2004, the Patient noticed an indentation in her right breast. Follow-up care revealed stage IV incurable breast cancer. According to the Plaintiffs, the cancer was present in 2001, and was treatable and curable had it been properly detected and reported. The Defendants conceded very little and alleged, as an affirmative defense, that the Patient knew that repeat mammograms were needed but failed to come back until it was too late. The case was tried to a jury over four consecutive days. The jury began deliberations on a Friday and resumed and announced its verdict on the following Monday. It found the Defendants negligent, but apportioned 20% of the fault to the Plaintiffs, apparently based upon the Patient’s failure to have a timely follow-up mammogram. The Defendants appeal, raising a host of issues. We affirm.
NEW SECTION - STANDARD OF CARE:
1. Thomas Geesling, Individually and as the Administrator of the Estate of Sharon Geesling v. Livingston Regional Hospital, LLC, No. 2007-02726-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2008).
The Court's Summary:
The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant in this medical malpractice case after finding that the affidavit of plaintiff’s nursing expert failed to meet the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115. Based upon our conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the affidavit of plaintiff’s expert witness did not satisfy Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
2. Beverly Lockard v. Christopher H. Bratton, M.D., et al., No. W2007-02820-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2009).
The Court's Summary:
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court erred in excluding Appellant’s expert’s standard of care and causation opinions and in granting summary judgment to the Appellees as to Appellant’s medical malpractice and lack of informed consent claims. We affirm.
3. Melissa Michelle Cox v. M. A. Primary and Urgent Care Clinic and Austin Adams, No. M2007-01840-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2009).
The Court's Summary:
Plaintiff in medical malpractice action appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant doctor and clinic. The trial court found that the deposition testimony of Plaintiff’s expert witness failed to establish genuine issues of material fact with respect to the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115(a). Finding error, we reverse and remand the case for further proceedings.
4. Jackie Jackson, Administrator of the Estate of Karon Jackson v. Johnny Joyner, M.D., et al., No. W2008-00906-COA-R3-CV (Apr. 7, 2009).
The Court's Summary:
The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to exclude portions of Plaintiff’s expert’s deposition testimony and awarded Defendants summary judgment. We vacate the award of summary judgment, reverse the trial court’s order excluding testimony of the expert witness, and remand for further proceedings.
The Court's Summary:
The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to exclude portions of Plaintiff’s expert’s deposition testimony and awarded Defendants summary judgment. We vacate the award of summary judgment, reverse the trial court’s order excluding testimony of the expert witness, and remand for further proceedings.
5. Herb A. Harris vs. Pradumna S. Jain, M.D., No. E2008-01506-COA-R3-CV (Aug. 31, 2009).
The Court's Summary:
This is an appeal by Herb A. Harris (“the plaintiff”) of a summary judgment granted in favor of Pradumna S. Jain, M.D. (“the defendant”). The order granting summary judgment recites that the ruling is based on the fact that the plaintiff’s expert, whose specialty is internal medicine, is not qualified to testify as to the standard of care in the defendant’s specialty of pediatric psychiatry. The defendant’s motion, while properly supported by the affidavit of an expert, does not, on its face, state that it is based on a challenge to the qualifications of the plaintiff’s expert. Because the plaintiff came to the hearing expecting to argue the expert’s qualifications, and because the plaintiff’s expert, a doctor of internal medicine, essentially acknowledged in his testimony a lack of knowledge of the standard of care for pediatric psychiatry, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.
The Court's Summary:
This is an appeal by Herb A. Harris (“the plaintiff”) of a summary judgment granted in favor of Pradumna S. Jain, M.D. (“the defendant”). The order granting summary judgment recites that the ruling is based on the fact that the plaintiff’s expert, whose specialty is internal medicine, is not qualified to testify as to the standard of care in the defendant’s specialty of pediatric psychiatry. The defendant’s motion, while properly supported by the affidavit of an expert, does not, on its face, state that it is based on a challenge to the qualifications of the plaintiff’s expert. Because the plaintiff came to the hearing expecting to argue the expert’s qualifications, and because the plaintiff’s expert, a doctor of internal medicine, essentially acknowledged in his testimony a lack of knowledge of the standard of care for pediatric psychiatry, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.
6. Alan Gentry v. Martin H. Wagner, M.D., No. M2008-02369-COA-R3-CV (June 30, 2009).
The Court's Summary:
Patient brought a negligence action against neurologist for injuries allegedly arising out of a court-ordered medical evaluation. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint to include allegations of sexual battery. We also agree with the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the neurologist based on the absence of expert testimony to support the plaintiff’s claim. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s decision.
The Court's Summary:
Patient brought a negligence action against neurologist for injuries allegedly arising out of a court-ordered medical evaluation. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint to include allegations of sexual battery. We also agree with the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the neurologist based on the absence of expert testimony to support the plaintiff’s claim. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s decision.
7. John Mark Watkins, Surviving Spouse of Amy Rose Watkins, Deceased v. Affiliated Internists, P.C. and Travis K. Pardue, M.D., No. M2008-01205-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2009).
The Court's Summary:
Davidson County - This is a medical malpractice wrongful death action. The plaintiff’s decedent underwent surgery and developed an infection after the surgery. The decedent visited the defendant medical clinic, the office of the defendant primary care physician, to treat the pain from the infection. The defendant physician was the supervising physician at the clinic. The decedent was seen by a physician assistant at the clinic, but not by the defendant physician. The physician assistant prescribed the decedent nausea medicine and enough Demerol to take four pills a day for three weeks. The physician assistant did not schedule a follow-up visit. After about two weeks, the decedent called the defendant clinic complaining of nausea and vomiting. The decedent was told to go to the emergency room if she felt dehydrated; she did not go to the emergency room. That same day the decedent died as a result of acute combined drug intoxication. The decedent’s husband filed this lawsuit against the defendant medical clinic and the defendant physician, alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death. During the pendency of the litigation, the defendant physician was disciplined administratively for failing to comply with medical regulations that required, inter alia, that the physician review the physician assistant’s prescription of controlled medication to the decedent. The plaintiff then sought to amend the complaint to include a claim of negligence per se against the physician based on the regulatory infraction; his motion was denied. After much discovery, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the expert testimony adduced by the plaintiff was insufficient to establish the standard of care or that the alleged negligence caused the decedent’s death. The trial court granted the motion. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm the trial court’s decision in part and reverse in part. We find that the regulation requiring the physician to review the decedent’s chart and data within a certain time period constitutes a standard of care, and that the trial court erred in denying part of the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint to assert a claim of negligence per se. We affirm the grant of summary judgment on the remaining claims.
8. Estate of Jeffrey Mauro Cusatis vs. Robert R. Casey, M.D., No. E2008-01786-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2009).
The Court's Summary:
In this appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The Court's Summary:
Davidson County - This is a medical malpractice wrongful death action. The plaintiff’s decedent underwent surgery and developed an infection after the surgery. The decedent visited the defendant medical clinic, the office of the defendant primary care physician, to treat the pain from the infection. The defendant physician was the supervising physician at the clinic. The decedent was seen by a physician assistant at the clinic, but not by the defendant physician. The physician assistant prescribed the decedent nausea medicine and enough Demerol to take four pills a day for three weeks. The physician assistant did not schedule a follow-up visit. After about two weeks, the decedent called the defendant clinic complaining of nausea and vomiting. The decedent was told to go to the emergency room if she felt dehydrated; she did not go to the emergency room. That same day the decedent died as a result of acute combined drug intoxication. The decedent’s husband filed this lawsuit against the defendant medical clinic and the defendant physician, alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death. During the pendency of the litigation, the defendant physician was disciplined administratively for failing to comply with medical regulations that required, inter alia, that the physician review the physician assistant’s prescription of controlled medication to the decedent. The plaintiff then sought to amend the complaint to include a claim of negligence per se against the physician based on the regulatory infraction; his motion was denied. After much discovery, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the expert testimony adduced by the plaintiff was insufficient to establish the standard of care or that the alleged negligence caused the decedent’s death. The trial court granted the motion. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm the trial court’s decision in part and reverse in part. We find that the regulation requiring the physician to review the decedent’s chart and data within a certain time period constitutes a standard of care, and that the trial court erred in denying part of the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint to assert a claim of negligence per se. We affirm the grant of summary judgment on the remaining claims.
8. Estate of Jeffrey Mauro Cusatis vs. Robert R. Casey, M.D., No. E2008-01786-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2009).
The Court's Summary:
In this appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
NEW SECTION - CORPORATE LIABILITY DOCTRINE:
1. Debra M. Barkes, Individually and as Surviving Spouse of Jewell Wayne Barkes, Deceased v. River Park Hospital, Inc. and River Park Hospital (TN), No. M2006-01214-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2008).
The Court's Summary:
Wife of patient brought medical malpractice action for the wrongful death of her husband who died at home later in the same day that he was examined in the emergency room. The patient had been examined, diagnosed and discharged by a nurse practitioner without being seen by a physician. The only direct claim against the hospital was whether the hospital was liable because a written policy, which required that every patient presented to the emergency room be seen by a physician, was not followed by the health care providers in the Emergency Department. The jury returned a verdict exonerating all of the individual health care providers directly or indirectly involved with the care of the plaintiff’s husband; however, the jury found that the hospital was 100% at fault for his death. The hospital appealed contending the jury’s verdict must be set aside because it was inconsistent and irreconcilable. Because the jury found that none of the health care providers were at fault, the only basis for upholding the jury’s verdict against the Hospital is upon the doctrine of corporate liability. Tennessee has not adopted the doctrine of corporate liability; therefore, the verdict, exonerating all individual health care providers of fault and finding the hospital 100% at fault, constitutes an inconsistent and irreconcilable verdict. We, therefore, reverse and remand the case for a new trial.
NEW SECTION - PEER REVIEW ACT:
1. Kimberly Powell vs. Community Health Systems, Inc., National Health Care of Cleveland, Inc., d/b/a Cleveland Community Hospital, No. E2008-00535-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2009) (Susano, Charles D. dissenting).
The Court's Summary:
We granted an appeal pursuant to Rule 9, Tenn. R. App. P., to determine the extent of discovery that would be allowed of an infection control nurse who had investigated the infectious rates at the hospital, because the investigation was prompted by the hospital’s Quality Control Committee. Defendants argued that the investigation was confidential and privileged, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 63-6-219. The Trial Court allowed discovery and we affirm, setting forth parameters of the discovery.
2. Christy Leann Smith v. Leona M. Pratt, Executrix of the Estate of Stephen M. Pratt, M.D., Deceased, and HCA Health Services of TN, Inc. d/b/a Centennial Medical Center, No. M2008-01540-COA-R9-CV (Apr. 22, 2009).
The Court's Summary:
Patient sued her surgeon for malpractice and the hospital for allowing the surgeon to practice in its facilities. The trial court ruled that the hospital was not eligible for the qualified immunity provided in Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-6-219(d)(1). We reverse.
The Court's Summary:
Patient sued her surgeon for malpractice and the hospital for allowing the surgeon to practice in its facilities. The trial court ruled that the hospital was not eligible for the qualified immunity provided in Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-6-219(d)(1). We reverse.
3. Richard V. Fuller and wife MaryAnn Fuller v. John Dennie Crabtree, Jr., M.D., No. M2008-01227-COA-R9-CV (Apr. 16, 2009).
The Court's Summary:
A doctor who earlier submitted an affidavit in this medical malpractice action and who also participated in the peer review process at the defendant doctor’s hospital entered an appearance as plaintiffs’ counsel. The trial court declined the defendant doctor’s request to have the physician/attorney disqualified as plaintiffs’ counsel. After considering the issue on interlocutory appeal, we reverse and find that the physician/attorney is disqualified and may not represent plaintiffs.
The Court's Summary:
A doctor who earlier submitted an affidavit in this medical malpractice action and who also participated in the peer review process at the defendant doctor’s hospital entered an appearance as plaintiffs’ counsel. The trial court declined the defendant doctor’s request to have the physician/attorney disqualified as plaintiffs’ counsel. After considering the issue on interlocutory appeal, we reverse and find that the physician/attorney is disqualified and may not represent plaintiffs.
4. Marcel Eluhu, M.D. v. HCA Health Services of Tennessee, Inc., d/b/a/ Centennial Medical Center, No. M2008-01152-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2009).
The Court's Summary:
Cardiologist whose hospital privileges were revoked brought suit against the hospital asserting multiple causes of action, including breach of contract. Finding the hospital entitled to immunity under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act and the Tennessee Peer Review Law, the chancellor granted the hospital’s motion for summary judgment on all claims for monetary damages. The court subsequently granted the hospital’s motion for summary judgment on all remaining claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. We have concluded that the court erred in granting summary judgment on the claims for injunctive relief other than the breach of contract claims. Otherwise, we affirm the trial court’s decision.
The Court's Summary:
Cardiologist whose hospital privileges were revoked brought suit against the hospital asserting multiple causes of action, including breach of contract. Finding the hospital entitled to immunity under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act and the Tennessee Peer Review Law, the chancellor granted the hospital’s motion for summary judgment on all claims for monetary damages. The court subsequently granted the hospital’s motion for summary judgment on all remaining claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. We have concluded that the court erred in granting summary judgment on the claims for injunctive relief other than the breach of contract claims. Otherwise, we affirm the trial court’s decision.